Joint security centre at the Old and Middle Age Bangen Airport was inaugurated: additional fixed military facilities were added within the framework of the “government security” of the two parties

China and Laos inaugurated the Joint Safeguards and Training Centre and the China-Old Friendship Aviation Academy at Bangen Airport, 50 km north of Vientiane, on 29 September. Three months ago, the General Secretary of the CCP, Xi Jinping, and the Central Secretary of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, Tom Long, publicly proposed during their talks in Beijing that both sides “co-defensively defend the socialist system and the Communist Party's status of government”; The subsequent joint Chinese-Chinese declaration established a mechanism for strategic dialogue between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Public Security, “3+3”, and included the prevention of the so-called “colour revolution”, the maintenance of “political and institutional security” in law enforcement security cooperation. The fixed military facilities at the Banquon airport have added a permanent aviation training and security node to the inter-party-defence-public security relationship.

The Ministry of Defence of China states that the Joint Security and Training Centre at Bangen Airport is used to assist Laos in strengthening the training of air force pilots, to maintain normal operations by both sides and to build and use “no third party”. Reuters reported on 30 September that the airport had been built on a large scale since the end of 2025, with large runways, parallel taxiways, aprons and many new buildings already in place by early September of this year; China has made public statements that do not indicate the size of its future presence, equipment and specific facilities.

Sat charts record not a short-term military show, but a fixed aviation infrastructure

Satellite images from Reuters show that the agricultural land and the simple earth runway that was previously visible at the Banquon airport have been replaced by large-scale aviation facilities. New runways, taxiways, aprons and buildings mean that mid-aged military cooperation moves further from personnel training to joint exercises to fixed infrastructure levels.

According to Rachel Vandenbrink, Senior Analyst, Australian Institute of Strategic Policy, the name “Joint Safeguards and Training Centre” may mean that the Liberation Army seeks to maintain a logistics hub that supports the rotation of troops and may retain a small front-line security force. Collin Koh, a scholar at the Lagrenan Institute of International Studies at the South Pacific University of Technology, Singapore, argued that its form could be closer to China ' s security base in Djibouti than in Yunbong port, Cambodia. The judgement of the two persons is military; The most critical verifiable fact remains that fixed runways and facilities have been built, while personnel, equipment and access rights have not yet been made public by the senior and middle levels.

“Co-defensement of Communist Party rule” is the political basis of the Chinese and old official itself

The airport cannot be seen independently from the institutional changes in the old relationship this year. On 5 June, during talks between Xi Jinping and Tornlong, it was clearly stated that the two sides would work together to preserve the socialist system and the Communist Party in power, implement the new five-year cooperation plan between the two parties and deepen the exchange of experiences in governing the country.

The Chinese-Chinese joint statement issued the following day further linked inter-party political relations to cooperation with the national security services. The Parties decide to establish a “3+3” strategic dialogue mechanism between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Public Security, to integrate development and security; (b) Continuing political work, joint training, medical guard and staff training in the defence field; In the area of law enforcement security, there is a clear case for strengthening information exchange and sharing of experiences around protection against the “colour revolution” and for working together to maintain political and institutional security.

This means that the stated objectives of security cooperation between China and old are not limited to border crime, counter-terrorism or disaster relief. The bipartisan document incorporates the Communist Party ' s status in power, regime and institutional security, together with national defence and public security cooperation, into bilateral institutional arrangements. The Bangen airport subsequently formed a fixed aviation facility, which was jointly maintained by the two forces, which added to the relationship a long-term military infrastructure.

From 3+3 to Airport: Inter-party, public security and military cooperation is institutionalized

Both China and Laos have been under the Communist Party for a long time. The Chinese public documents consider the two-party relationship to be an important political basis for bilateral relations, while the “3+3” mechanism for the first time has incorporated the three branches of foreign affairs, defence and public security into the same security coordination structure in the form of a strategic dialogue at the ministerial level. The joint statement also provided for the establishment of a ministerial meeting mechanism for law enforcement, which included cooperation on justice, border, security for major projects, etc.

This structure has given the Banquon airport more significance than a mere flight school. It is not an isolated Chinese aid project, but rather a situation that has become a regular feature of inter-party cooperation, security mechanisms, joint military exercises and cross-border military transport. The determination of how much military use capacity Beijing has acquired in Laos requires that these systems and infrastructure be observed on the same map.

“Safeguard” is not an administrative term: the Liberation Army itself has directly linked the security capability to the combat capability

The Ministry of Defence of China uses the name “Joint Safeguards and Training Centre” for the airport in Bangen. The term “security” is more directly explained in the SLA's open military doctrine articles: modern joint combat requires a deep convergence of the chain of security with the chain of operations, and considers integrated joint security capabilities to be an important condition for the generation of combat power. This does not provide a separate proof that the Bangan airport has a combat role, but it is clear that “guarantees” are part of the military capacity-building in themselves within the SLA system, not just the daily administrative maintenance of the airport.

In the near same period as Banqué airport, the medium-old “Peace Train-2026” joint exercise has demonstrated the practical capability of cross-border military security. On 6 September, the Chinese 150-man guard unit, which is based on the Army Medical University, and which draws together air force and joint security unit personnel to cross the Chinese-Chinese railway by military health train; A movement control centre in the southern war zone of China also sent personnel to Laos to coordinate cross-border transport and customs clearance. Subsequently, over 700 middle-aged and old-age personnel participated in joint exercises, which were conducted in joint command, rescue and joint security, and for the first time were systematically used by drones, machine dogs and unmanned vehicles.

The railway delivery line is not a project with the airport aviation facilities at Banqué, but both show that the old and middle military cooperation has multiple levels of cross-border transport, joint training, logistics and fixed aviation facilities.

The Bagan model has a similar expression of “joint maintenance” compared to Yunbong port

In 2025, the Chinese Ministry of Defence announced that the Chongayun-Hong Kong Joint Safeguards and Training Centre was operational, stating that Chong Cai-Cai “the necessary personnel are to maintain the Centre in a common manner”. This year's formulation for the Banquon airport is also “to maintain normal functioning by both sides”. The names and management of the two facilities are very similar, but the details of the “required presence” at the Bangan airport are not currently made public, so that the Yunchong port personnel model cannot simply be transposed to Laos.

China has another official secure base in Djibouti. Reuters noted that China also has a joint training and security centre in Yunbong port and has continued to expand its regional military presence. The particular feature of the airport is that it is an aviation facility, which is a runway, taxiway and apron that naturally relates to what type of aircraft can be flown, how long can it rotate and what logistics can be provided on the ground.

The true nature of the Banquon airport is determined by its presence, equipment and authority

The full text of the Banquon Airport cooperation agreement is not currently available to the senior and middle school. The most important undisclosed information, therefore, is not the term “base”, but rather the ownership of facilities, the authority to move airports, the Chinese presence arrangements, the type of aircraft that can be deployed, the military storage capability, the conditions of use during the crisis, the duration of the agreement and the control and termination powers of the Lao side.

The spokesman for the Ministry of Defence of Thailand, Surasant Kongsiri, stated to Reuters that it was up to the Lao People ' s Democratic Republic to allow the establishment of the relevant facilities in China and that Thailand would continue to observe subsequent developments. The Lao Foreign Service did not respond to the questions raised by Reuters regarding facilities.

From the documents already made public, Banquín airport has achieved at least one clear transformation: the two-party cooperation, the exchange of national defence, the public security mechanism and the joint military performance that existed in the old-Chinese-Chinese relationship, now has an additional fixed aviation security and training facility, which is maintained by both parties. The next thing that is worth following is not the name, but the actual time of stay, equipment deployment and airport access that the Chinese army has acquired — data that will determine the real location of the airport in the military network of the Liberation Army abroad.