Behind the same scene of the summit, the story of Beijing's "non-Western order" was a crack.

The SCO summit placed leaders like Xi Jinping, Putin and Modi on the same diplomatic stage. Beijing wants to see an expanding “non-Western order”: China provides a platform, Russia seeks a deep diplomatic depth, India maintains strategic autonomy, and other members seek space between security, energy and economic interests. But the more the emphasis on solidarity, the more the contradiction within this mechanism becomes apparent.

The Associated Press report on the SCO summit states that China and Russia are using the SCO to shape a platform that can counterbalance US and Western influence. Reuters reports of Xi's meeting with Putin also indicate that Beijing and Moscow continue to emphasize the stability of bilateral relations and try to demonstrate strategic coordination through multilateral forums.

Beijing is not for ordinary summit

For the CPC, SCO is not a mere regional security forum, but a tool for shaping international discourse. Beijing has repeatedly emphasized the “anti-hegemonic” of the “multipolar” “global South” with the real aim of weakening the system of rules, with the United States and its allies at the centre, and of packaging the Chinese model as an alternative for developing countries.

Such narratives are not without an audience. Many countries were dissatisfied with Western sanctions, the dollar system, trade rules and security alliances, and wished to preserve bargaining space in the competition between China and the United States. It is in this spirit that Beijing uses to tie up economic cooperation, security coordination and political symbols and to create a diplomatic scene “a choice other than the United States”.

Central and Russian Convergence with India

However, the most obvious contradiction in SCO is also from these key members on the stage. China and Russia are highly close to anti-Western narratives, but they are not fully equal. Russia is more dependent on Chinese markets, technology and financial corridors as a result of war and sanctions; China, for its part, uses Russia to hold the West hostage, while avoiding the risk of being dragged into deeper sanctions by Moscow.

India's role is more complex. The presence of Modi at the same table does not mean that India is headed for Beijing. India is involved in both SCO and the Quartet security dialogue; It is also a defence against China's energy purchases and border and industrial policies. Beijing wanted India to be included in the “non-Western solidarity” picture, but the core logic of New Delhi was still its own interests, not its acceptance of a regional order led by the Communist Party.

So-called unity doesn't hide security doubts

There is no contradiction between the SCO members. The Chinese-India border conflict, the vigilance of Central Asian countries in their traditional influence over Russia, the competition between energy and water resources among member countries, and the countries’ defence against China’s economic expansion are not all things that can be eliminated by a summit.

Beijing wanted to cover those cracks with a big slogan, but geopolitics had never been a photo-demonstrator. While SCO could provide a platform for external demonstration, it would be difficult to form a NATO-style common security commitment or an EU-style institutional integration. It is more like a political space where different grievances, different calculations and different fears are woven together.

Warning to democratic States

Even so, democratic States cannot underestimate the political function of SCO. It does not necessarily form a close alliance, but it does help powerful regimes such as the Chinese Communist Party and Russia to exchange narrative resources, weaken the pressure on sanctions, expand their influence on developing countries and support each other in international organizations.

Beijing is not the one that is best at immediately creating a complete alternative system, but rather the one that continues to erode the legitimacy of existing rules: to describe human rights as internal affairs, aggression as security concerns, economic coercion as development cooperation, and authoritarian governance as a stable experience. It is this narrative stage that the summit provided.

The real problem

Therefore, the summit should not be seen only as a handshake and a frame of reference for leaders, but rather as a means by which Beijing can expand the institutional reach, weaken the human rights and rule of law agenda and promote international rules that are more favourable to powerful nations. The “multipolarization” of the Chinese Communist Party is not necessarily the equivalent of a more equitable world order; In many cases, it may mean less transparency, weaker accountability and greater power space.

The SCO’s picture can be a lively one, but its core logic is not complicated: Beijing will transform international pressure on its own authoritarian system into diplomatic assets, and discontent with Western order into acceptance of the ruling position of the Communist Party. Democratic States that see it as a summit without seeing it as part of a long-standing narrative war underestimate the CCP ' s ability to shape the international order.