One by American Artificial Intelligence Company Anthropic released a threat intelligence report </a" on 10 September, presenting how China's local security system tried to use the generated AI to advance "stable" surveillance in public records. According to the report, the operators associated with the Chinese municipal public security and national security system used Claude to establish a surveillance process, to consult the Government ' s surveillance database and to generate daily bulletins; Account number X, “Señor Li is not your teacher”, was explicitly listed in the report as one of the subjects being monitored. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/how-anthropic-says-claude-was-used-weapons-spying-cyber-operations-2026-09-11/"target" = _blank" rel = `noopener noreferrer' data-linked-reference= `tru' data-reference-label = `Resultant Independent Report'" Reuters then independently reported the main findings of the report relating to China's related surveillance operations.

From an offshore protest account, see how the surveillance border crosses the border

in the case No. GTG-14021, the action was not just to observe cyberintelligence in China. The goal was to reach Hong Kong Democrats, organizers of the 6th and 4th commemorations, Uighur Initiative and international human rights bodies from within the country. Figure 6 of the report shows directly the account number “Sere Miss Lee is not your teacher” and indicates that it is one of the accounts monitored by the operation.

原始来源 · anthropic.comDetecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026anthropic.com ↗
X账号“李老师不是你老师”资料截图。资料图片,用于识别Anthropic报告点名的监控对象,并非本次监控行动现场照片|来源:Radio Free Asia
X账号“李老师不是你老师”资料截图。资料图片,用于识别Anthropic报告点名的监控对象,并非本次监控行动现场照片|来源:Radio Free Asia · 查看图片来源 ↗

Anthropic describes this group as “stable” surveillance and transnational repression by local Chinese public security and security-related operators.

This means that an offshore account that is known for receiving submissions of protests, labour disputes and reviewed information in China is included in the same information-gathering framework with key persons in China and civil society organizations abroad in the technical logic of the relevant security systems.

Three chains of operation: Cyberpolice, Police Academy personnel and local security services

The report does not disclose the names of the persons involved, but gives a different profile of the institutions involved. The three chains disclosed were:

  • Municipal police network : running the domestic surveillance process using Claude Code and custom-made features, searching the government surveillance database and producing daily political-sensitive events;
  • Public Security Investigators and Postgraduate Police Academy: Report that it has made 10 private Chinese citizens the subject of so-called “control” and requested the generation of recommendations for disposal;
  • Relevant local security agency operators: production of daily “status alert” bulletins, monitoring of overseas dissidents and civil society organizations and pre-action information gathering on legal protest sites abroad.

Anthropic states that the local SNSB's judgement of its location in Zhejiang is medium confidence and that it does not include a specific city or institution in the report, and therefore cannot, at this stage, further place responsibility on an unrecognized local SNS department in Zhejiang.

“Full love” is not only read, but is also rated, classified and converted to a target audience

Another relevant Chinese project, GTG-14022, revealed in the report, was a commercial contractor, judged by Anthropic to be likely to work for a government client, who asked Claude to act as “senior emergency analyst for the Government of the People's Republic of China”, processing over 15 to 30 items from platforms such as Twitter, X, YouTube, Telegram and Facebook, and rateing them according to their political sensitivity.

2021年拍摄的北京中国公安部主楼资料图,用于说明报告所涉中国公安系统机构背景;Anthropic没有公开涉事市级公安单位名称,因此该图不是涉事机构现场照片|来源:Wikimedia Commons
2021年拍摄的北京中国公安部主楼资料图,用于说明报告所涉中国公安系统机构背景;Anthropic没有公开涉事市级公安单位名称,因此该图不是涉事机构现场照片|来源:Wikimedia Commons · 查看图片来源 ↗

The targets of the monitoring include labour and student movement, Uighur and Tibetan communities, Taiwan politicians, overseas dissidents, religious groups, foreign media and international human rights organizations. According to the report, some of the documents generated even proposed enforcement measures that could be implemented only by State bodies.

AI allows traditional stability from artificial to replicable workstream

This report is not the first time that public security officials have monitored dissent, but rather that the monitoring is being softwareized and standardized. Anthropic states that in one case the operator wrote the workflow into an AI operating manual for other officers within the Bureau; Another case involved the use of automatic browsers for extraction, government database queries and business communication tools for distribution, which gathered information into a continuous process of reporting to superiors.

The main building of the Ministry of Public Security in Beijing can only serve as institutional background for the Chinese public security system and not as the municipal public security unit referred to by Anthropic. The report itself does not disclose the names of the specific municipal boards, so responsibility investigations still require additional internal documentation, procurement records or local system building information to be further locked.

The cost of technology for transnational repression is declining

Reuters reports that the targets of the surveillance include Uighurs, Tibetans, Taiwan politicians and activists. Anthropic indicates that the relevant account number has been blocked and that it has started tracking the wider digital characteristics of the operator.

原始来源 · reuters.comHow Anthropic says Claude was used for weapons, spying and cyber operationsreuters.com ↗

Outside the Wall, it is argued that this disclosure has brought new levels of risk to Chinese dissidents abroad: cross-border surveillance, which in the past required extensive manual collection, translation and collation, can now help security agencies to automatically capture information across platforms, create profiles of people, judge so-called political sensitivities and create “pacing awareness” products that can be reported directly. When the “stable” database in the country is connected to the same workflow as the social platforms abroad, the geographical borders of transnational repression are further defunct by technology.

The most valuable next tracker is the lack of open local institutional identity in Anthropic, the relationship between government procurement and contractors in the relevant control systems, and whether these AI-generated “control” recommendations have been translated into actual interception, interviews, exit restrictions or overseas harassment operations.

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