A former civilian police officer in Zhejiang Tai County reported the origin of the two brothers' property and called on the disciplinary committee to intervene.

On 10 September, Ike Wen, a civilian police officer who claimed to be the official of the Huangjii Substation of the Public Security Bureau of Zhejiang Province and Taizhou, publicly reported to his two brothers Guangxi and Il Xinhong through social platforms, alleging that they had “unknown origin of large-scale property” and publicly called on the Superior Council to investigate the law.

In his public address, Ji Wen stated that his brother, Ji Guangwu, was a civil servant of the market supervision authority of the Yellowstone Region in Taizhou, Zhejiang Province, and that Chi Chi Ik was the new deputy director of the market supervision authority of the Huang Rock Region in West Suo. The above-mentioned identity information and the related property allegations are taken from the public statements of the source.

According to Ji Man, the assets in the name of the two reported persons or actually owned included a plant of about 10 acres, three villas, a double-commodity house and a commercial house in Shanghai. On this basis, Ji Wen challenged the origin of the property and requested the disciplinary inspection body to intervene in the investigation.

The particular feature of the report was that the complainant was close to his brother and that he claimed to have had a professional experience in the public security system. The problem of public reporting of public officials ' property by their relatives is not common and prompts the incident to receive online attention.

The real place where Ii Wen reported this time is not just a few villas, a factory or a few commercial houses, but a long-standing question for the Chinese public: how much wealth can a person who is paid by a civil servant and holds executive power accumulate, and why can Chinese officials’ property not really be left in the sun?

In a political system that refuses to impose a regime of disclosure of official property and that largely controls the control of the ruling party itself, “where large amounts of property come from” is often not an occasional phenomenon, but a public question inherent in the structure of power. The Chinese Communist Party has been calling for anti-corruption for decades, and there have been numerous corruption cases, from village officials to senior provincial officials. The so-called “devious” social perception persists essentially because of the lack of external checks and balances of power, the lack of public oversight of official property, restrictions on press investigations and the real pressure on ordinary citizens to ask about official wealth.

As a result, Ii Wen reported two brothers and sisters in the market-based regulatory system, which has taken on more significance than a conflict within a family. If a public official can be specifically alleged to own 10 acres of plant, three villas and a number of commercial houses, the question should first be answered not just by the informant but by the authority that has the income of the cadre, the property register, the business register and the financial information: under whose name are these properties registered? When? Where did the money come from? Is it compatible with legal income?

More worth asking, if these assets were to be present for a long time, why had the oversight system not previously found out? If the report is false, the evidence should be made public to clarify it; If the report is true, the power and money relationship behind the wealth and the responsibility of supervision should continue to be pursued. The so-called “internal investigation” cannot be allowed to end up with a conclusion without process, without evidence and without responsibility.

The real problem in the Chinese civil service has never been just a few corrupt officials, but rather a system that refuses to disclose the property of officials and does not allow society to exercise full oversight power, and is itself a breeding ground for constant corruption. The effectiveness of the monitoring mechanism itself is a matter of concern when officials ' property, business interests and family wealth can only be accessed by relatives and by means of a report by their own names.

Ii Wen has targeted his brother and brother, which makes the report a rare cruel one. But what the public really needs to see is not that it is “regarded” that it is “not going to be able to do” after another “reveal”, but that the list of property, the source of funds, the tenure relationship and the chain of responsibility are completely unmasked. If the fight against corruption is based on internal selectivity and official property remains a secret account that cannot be discussed publicly, then a private judgement like “no official, no greedy” will not disappear with slogans, but will only be reinforced in repeated reports of officials falling and being called.